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BRINGING MORAL VALUES INTO A FLAWED
PLEA-BARGAINING SYSTEMt
Stephanos Bibastt
INTRODUCTION
Albert Alschuler and I agree on more than meets the eye. We
agree that Alford and nolo contendere pleas are shocking injustices,
the products of a bureaucratized, utilitarian, assembly-line criminal
justice system. We also agree that plea bargains are flawed substitutes
for full-fledged jury trials, which both safeguard accuracy and serve as
communal morality plays. We live in a fallen and imperfect world,
however, one in which plea bargaining is not going to disappear any-
time soon. In this real world of plea bargaining, can we make any-
thing good come of guilty pleas? Or is any attempt to do so an
immoral deal with the devil? Here is where Alschuler and I part com-
pany. The irony is that Alschuler's approach means fewer trials, more
pleas, and more dishonesty in a system that cries out for honest,
straightforward moral messages.
I
THE MEANING AND MESSAGE OF PLEAS
The criminal justice system uses large sentence discounts to in-
duce guilty pleas. Of course these discounts exert pressure on defend-
ants to plead guilty. As I acknowledged in my original article "most
guilty pleas are not the fruit of genuine repentance. Instead, defend-
ants feign repentance to earn sentence reductions."'
Alschuler makes a huge logical leap from this point. He con-
cludes that because inducements influence pleas, "a guilty plea cannot
be a guilty plea" but is necessarily a sham with no truth value and no
t © 2003, Stephanos Bibas. All Rights Reserved.
tt Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; former Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney, Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
(bibas@philo.org). B.A., Columbia; B.A., M.A., Oxford; J.D., Yale. I am grateful to Randy
Bezanson and Tung Yin for comments on earlier drafts and to Al Alschuler for our enjoya-
ble if spirited agreement to disagree on these matters.
I Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure:
The Case ofAlford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1361, 1399 & n. 194 (2003)
(footnote omitted) (citing Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, infra note 18, at
662-63).
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message.2 He overstates his case, however, by equating guilty pleas
with confessions at gunpoint or under torture.3 No person of reason-
able firmness resists such physical duress, but a number of defendants
choose to reject plea bargains, protest their innocence, and go to trial.
A defendant's plea thus means something to the defendant and to
others. This is why many "obviously guilty defendants" have to strug-
gle to admit guilt.4 This is why admissions of guilt, even if made ini-
tially to reap rewards, break down denial mechanisms and open the
way to healing and reform. 5 Alschuler's claim that all pleas are mean-
ingless shams does not square with his earlier interviews, which found
that defendants enter Alford pleas to protect their egos and save face. 6
In other words, defendants want these pleas because they attach
meaning to them and to straight guilty pleas. If all pleas were truly
meaningless, there would be no demand for Alford and nolo pleas.
Likewise, if all pleas were truly meaningless, victims and the pub-
lic would not object to Alford and nolo pleas. They do object, how-
ever. They understand that pleas carry meaning and that denials
send the wrong message. A rapist's denial means that the victim was
making up her accusation, or that she consented to sex, or that she
enjoyed being raped. The justice system must not put its stamp of
approval on these denials, because they victimize victims all over
again. Instead, victims need vindication and catharsis to begin the
healing process.7 It is telling that Alschuler says barely a word about
victims' reactions; evidently he considers them irrelevant.
Alschuler describes Alford pleas as "nonsense pleas,"8 but usually
they are just plain dishonest. He admits that most defendants who use
them are guilty and so are lying about their innocence. He rational-
izes this dishonesty as a response to a coercive system and says that our
plea-bargaining system is already deceptive. 9 Regrettably, a small mi-
nority of plea bargains do misstate charges and facts.u° But Al-
2 Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of
Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1416 (2003).
1 See id. at 1417.
4 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1304 (1975) (noting that "[o]nce the [Alford] plea is allowed, the compulsion upon a
defendant to admit his guilt disappears").
5 Bibas, supra note 1, Part IV.B.
6 See Alschuler, supra note 4, at 1280, 1287, 1304.
7 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1389.
8 Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1412.
9 See id. at 1414-15.
I) Empirical studies of federal sentencing suggest that only 20-35% of federal plea
bargains involve manipulation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. StephenJ. Schulhofer &
Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumven-
tion and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284, 1284-86 (1997).
The amount of outright dishonesty is probably much smaller; the only estimate of dishon-
est statements of fact in federal plea bargains is about 5%. Frank 0. Bowman, 1Il, To Tell
1426 [Vol. 88:1425
MORAL VALUES IN PLEA BARGAINING
schuler's point does not follow from this sad fact. The remedy for
dishonesty is not more dishonest pleas, but rather candor wherever
possible. Alford and nolo pleas are as good a place as any to start intro-
ducing candor.
II
THE JUSTIFICATION AND USE OF SENTENCE DIFFERENTIALS
Though Alschuler repeatedly calls the pressures of plea bargain-
ing "coercion," his attempts to assimilate sentencing differentials to
torture or duress go too far. For example, he compares plea bargain-
ing to ordering a person to sign a contract at gunpoint." But unlike
the contract at gunpoint, the prosecutor's threat to go to trial is a
lawful effort to seek a legislatively authorized sentence. As Robert
Scott and William Stuntz have explained, plea bargaining does not
rely on duress because prosecutors are not responsible for creating
defendants' predicament:
[C]oercion in the sense of few and unpalatable choices does not
necessarily negate voluntary choice. So long as the post-trial
sentences have not been manipulated by the prosecutor, the coer-
cive elements of the plea bargaining environment do not corrupt
the voluntariness of the plea agreement. A large sentencing differ-
ential does not imply coercion a priori.1 2
Alschuler further writes: "Bibas does not maintain that the court
should force the defendant to risk [the post-trial] penalty because im-
posing it might be necessary to vindicate the public interest."' 3 I do
maintain exactly that. The public interest requires heavier punish-
ment for those defendants who are most deeply in denial and are
found guilty at trial. As my article explains, these defendants are most
likely to recidivate, have done the least to assuage their victims' suffer-
ings, are the least contrite, and most need to learn lessons.' 4 Thus,
the various justifications for punishment (deterrence, incapacitation,
retribution, education, victim vindication, and reform) justify heavier
punishment for these defendants.
Suppose, however, that one joins Alschuler in wishing that de-
fendants could not benefit from sentence discounts. Perhaps an ideal
the Truth: The Problem of Prosecutorial "Manipulation" of Sentencing Facts, 8 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 324, 325 (1996) (citing Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process:
The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 844 (1992)). Fact bargain-
ing has become even less common in recent years, as probation officers have become ad-
ept at calling the tnie facts to the court's attention. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra, at 1292.
1 1 Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1417.
12 Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1920-21 (1992) (footnote omitted).
13I Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1415.
14 See Bibas, supra note 1, Part W.B-C.
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world would abolish or at least restrict and regulate these discounts.
But we do not live in an ideal world. Sentencing discounts will exist
for the foreseeable future, so we might as well make our lemons into
lemonade. Good can come even of a flawed system, just as roses may
grow well in manure.
There is a particular perversity in Alschuler's objection to my pro-
posal. After all, abolishing Alford and nolo contendere pleas should
mean moderately fewer plea bargains and more trials. Many if not
most defendants will switch to guilty pleas, but some will go to trial.
Alschuler, who has devoted his career to lamenting the cancerous
spread of plea bargaining, should welcome this restriction. More tri-
als means more safeguards, more scrutiny of those cases most in dis-
pute, and therefore more accuracy.
III
INNOCENCE, ACCURACY, AND CONFIDENCE IN JUSTICE
Alschuler next attacks my concern with accuracy and perceived
accuracy as hypocritical. He admits that most defendants who enter
Alford and nolo pleas are probably guilty, so abolishing these pleas
would be more accurate and honest for them. But he thinks that the
few innocent defendants need Alford and nolo pleas so that they can
plead guilty and reap plea bargains. Plea bargaining pressures them
to take pleas and, he says, they are morally entitled to do whatever
best serves their interests. Thus, he argues, the law ought to allow
Alford and nolo contendere pleas to make it easier for innocent de-
fendants to plead guilty. '5 His colleague Frank Easterbrook would go
even further. In Easterbrook's view, it is good for innocent defend-
ants to plead guilty whenever the expected sentence at trial, dis-
counted by the probability of acquittal, exceeds the plea bargain
offer. 16
Innocent defendants who are tempted to plead guilty often over-
estimate their chance of conviction at trial. Poor pretrial discovery
and pressure from defense attorneys may lead them to overestimate
their chances of conviction.' 7 Thus, the system should encourage
these defendants to persevere to acquittal at trial. Moreover, even if it
is sometimes rational for an innocent defendant to plead guilty, the
criminal justice system is wrong to encourage it. Easterbrook treats
guilty pleas by innocent defendants as a great utilitarian boon, but
they are morally offensive. Any criminal justice system, especially one
15 See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1415; Alschuler, supra note 4, at 1296-98.
16 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
289, 320 (1983) (justifying Alford pleas on this rationale).
17 See Stephen j. Schulhofer, CriminalJustice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17J. LEGAL
STUD. 43, 53-56, 78-79 (1988).
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as underfunded as ours, will regrettably convict some innocent de-
fendants. But there is a big difference between a criminal justice sys-
tem that purposely facilitates wrongful convictions via Alford pleas and
one that takes a stance against them. The former embraces injustice;
the latter recognizes with sorrow that injustice may occur but tries to
stop it. The former signals its callousness; the latter, its care and
concern.
Alschuler cannot see this difference.' 8 To his mind, any system
that involves plea bargaining must be indifferent to innocence and
coercion. Thus, he claims, reforms are little more than cosmetic win-
dow dressing for public consumption. But even a flawed system can
take good-faith steps in the right direction. The public realizes that
the system's intention matters. As Justice Holmes famously put it,
even a dog knows the difference between being stumbled over and
being kicked.' 9 The public will lose confidence in a system that pur-
posely uses Alford pleas to facilitate convicting the innocent. Con-
versely, abolishing these pleas is a good first step towards honestly
protecting the innocent. The point is not to hide injustice, but to
embrace a consistent message: innocent defendants should persevere
to trial to win acquittals.
There is only so much the system can do to ensure consistent
moral messages. Of course some defendants who admit guilt will later
change their stories and protest their innocence. Prison inmates do it
all the time in their habeas corpus petitions. But there is an enor-
mous difference between a collateral attack or other subsequent de-
nial and an Alford plea. In the former case, the convicted defendant
first admits guilt unequivocally in a guilty plea allocution. He later
changes his mind, contradicts his earlier story, and unilaterally asks
18 Alschuler's blindness to this point is particularly ironic because he has made the
same argument elsewhere. In responding to some authors who saw no difference between
giving light plea bargains to many innocent defendants and giving heavy sentences to a few
innocent defendants wrongly convicted at trial, he noted an important difference, namely
the difference between a criminal justice system that tries to find the truth
and sometimes fails and one that apparently does not care. Indeed, al-
though those who measure justice only by a statistical "bottom line" might
scoff at this suggestion, even the one defendant wrongly convicted at trial
might sense this difference; despite his longer sentence, he might be less
embittered by a mistaken assessment of the evidence in his case than all of
the innocent defendants would be by a system in which no one truly wished
to listen to the evidence at all.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REv. 652, 714 (1981).
The same point applies here. The justice system should try to obstruct guilty pleas by
innocent defendants, even if a few innocent defendants will instead be mistakenly con-
victed at trial and wind up with longer sentences. This effort to thwart mistaken convic-
tions is morally far preferable to consciously facilitating unjust convictions via Alford and
nolo pleas and trumpeting these pleas as an advantage.
19 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Little,
Brown & Co. 1963) (1881).
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the court to reopen a final conviction. With an Alford plea, the defen-
dant never admits guilt in the first place. Rather, the justice system
accepts and puts its seal of approval on his simultaneous equivocation
or denial. In the Sara Jane Olson case, the judge did all he could to
ensure a consistent guilty plea instead of allowing an Alford plea. The
result, Olson's apology for conspiring with and assisting bombers, was
a big change from her earlier defiant denials. And it meant a lot to
the family of another of Olson's victims, as they too insisted on a pub-
lic admission of guilt as a condition of a later Olson plea bargain. 211
This message was clearer and more satisfying to victims and the public
than a facially ambiguous Alford plea would have been.
IV
THERAPEUTIC PRESSURE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL
Alschuler objects to using pleas to influence a defendant's con-
science. He equates my proposal with the Spanish Inquisition, the
Chinese Cultural Revolution, and George Orwell's 1984.21 Once
again, Alschuler is carried away by the force of his own rhetoric. Re-
habilitation certainly can be abused, and past uses of torture, psycho-
surgery, and psychotropic drugs on offenders make one cringe. 22
Such invasive rehabilitation wrongly treats defendants not as moral
agents who must learn lessons, but as animals or robots to be fixed.
This scientific nightmare is a far cry from my proposal. A system with-
out Alford and nolo pleas does not treat the defendant as an automa-
ton, nor does it invade his brain or body. Instead, it operates by
appealing to the defendant's moral sense, his conscience. (This is the
fundamental difference between rehabilitation and moral reform.) It
uses jury trials as morality plays to teach moral lessons to those in
deepest denial. The trial itself, a classic procedural safeguard, is ther-
apeutic. Far from undermining the defendant's autonomy, presump-
tion of innocence, or privilege against self-incrimination, the trial
option respects his ultimate freedom of choice.23 Some defendants
20 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 1364-65 & nn.16-30; see also John M. Broder, In a Quiet
End to a Case, 4 Ex-Symbionese Liberation Army Members Plead Guilty to Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2002, at A]8 (noting Olson's later guilty plea to a related murder, in which she said "I
am truly sorry, and I will be sorry until the day I die"; the victims' families had insisted that
the defendants publicly admit their part in the death as a condition of this plea bargain).
21 Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1420.
22 See generally Sheldon Gelman, The Biological Alteration Cases, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1203, 1229-39 (1995) (describing the horrors and dehumanization of biologically invasive
methods of alteration, such as lobotomies and forcible administration of antipsychotropic
drugs).
23 One can also question how good the status quo is for autonomy. Defendants who
suffer from massive denial, delusion, and distorted thinking are far from ideal, fully in-
formed, autonomous, rational actors. Destroying their warped denial mechanisms may in
fact increase their autonomy and clarity of thought.
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will resent the confrontation at trial, as Alschuler supposes. But my
psychological and anecdotal evidence suggests that more often, con-
fronting denial can do some good.24
Alschuler's final criticism is not really at odds with my argument.
He points out that defense counsel must represent their clients' inter-
ests, instead of simply sitting in judgment of them or acting as ther-
apists. 25 I agree that defense counsel often will not be certain of guilt
and must zealously press possible innocence claims. Sometimes, how-
ever, defendants who want Alford pleas are "obviously guilty," as Al-
schuler himself recognizes. 26 Some defense counsel will press these
clients to break through their denials, while others may be more
hands-off.2 7 Alschuler and I agree that a defense lawyer's role is not
simply to promote the client's expressed selfish, short-term interests.
Defense counsel should also "encourage [clients] to consider the
moral implications of [their] choices." 28 Here, both Alschuler and I
oppose Alan Dershowitz's uncritical endorsement of no-holds-barred
advocacy.29 One might loosely analogize the lawyer-client relationship
to that of law clerks and judges. The law clerk does the judge a ser-
vice-up to a point-by challenging the judge and expressing an in-
dependent viewpoint. Once the judge hears this advice and settles
firmly on a course of action, the clerk's job is to implement the
judge's directions.
Alschuler does not mention a further nuance of my argument,
which is that a client's long-term interests may be at odds with his
expressed short-term desires. A lawyer representing a recidivist drunk
driver may be doing the client no favors by ignoring the client's drink-
ing problem and seeking acquittal. The client may be better off if the
lawyer persuades him to plead guilty and accept alcohol-abuse treat-
ment."" The same may be true of crimes that result from drug addic-
tion, pedophilia, kleptomania, or similar illnesses. These clients are
far from fully informed, clear-eyed, autonomous rational actors; they
may be blind to their own sicknesses. Defense lawyers can help their
24 See Bibas, supra note 1, Part IV.B-C.
25 Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1422-23.
26 See Alschuler, supra note 4, at 1304.
27 Alschuler notes that some defense counsel may press their clients hard to confront
guilt. He then turns around and recognizes that some defense counsel will take the path
of least resistance to earn "a quick buck." Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1423. In our system,
the path of least resistance to a quick buck may be an Alford plea instead of repeated, time-
consuming discussions that psychotherapists routinely engage in. In other words, Alford
pleas may be too easy a way out.
28 Id. at 1423.
29 Id. at 1423 & n.55.
30 See David B. Wexler, Some Reflections on Therapeutic Jurispnrudence and the Practice of
Criminal Law, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 206-08 (2002).
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clients confront and correct these pathologies if they see it as part of
their job.
CONCLUSION
At root, Alschuler's loathing of plea bargaining obstructs realistic,
incremental reform. To him, reforming the system from within
smacks of dealing with the devil or of mere window dressing. In his
mind, the best is the enemy of the good, because incremental reforms
might prop up a system that deserves only to be demolished.31 In the
real world, however, plea bargaining is here to stay. Though there is
some truth to his critique, his insistence on an ideologically pure ha-
tred of plea bargaining blinds him to any good that can come of it. As
long as plea bargaining exists, we can and should try to make it send
more clear, honest, and straightforward moral messages. In this case,
the solution is to abolish Alford and nolo pleas, so that defendants will
either admit guilt or learn from jury trials. Criminal justice is not just
about processing defendants efficiendy but is about teaching and vin-
dicating morality as well. I am pleased that Alschuler applauds my
underlying moral theme and hope that he and others will keep broad-
ening criminal procedure's focus beyond the blinders of utilitarian
efficiency.
31 Alschuler protests that he is open to minor reform, see Alschuler, supra note 2, at
1423 & n.57, but his rejection of my position as mere window-dressing that might add an
air of legitimacy to the system belies this claim.
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